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A.: Criminal Law--Trial--Presence of Accused During Trial

RECENT CASE COIA{ENTS
PRESENCE or AccuSED DURING
TRIL CRImINAL LAw TRIAL. - The accused, after arraignment upon indictment and
plea of not guilty, was absent from the courtroom during the time
the clerk called a panel of twenty jurors, swore them on their voir
dire, and examined them at some length. When his absence was
noticed, he was brought into the courtroom, and the jurors were
re-examined in his presence. Held, that under the statute providing
that a person indicted for felony shall be personally present during
the trial,' it is reversible error to examine jurors in absence of the
2
accused. State v. Martin.

In this case our court continues its strict construction of the
statute involved. Such has been the policy of the court since the
beginning as well as the policy of the Virginia court both now and
prior to the separation of the states. This has led to some reversals
on what appear to be technical grounds, such as absence upon
entering of plea of not guilty,3 upon argument on a motion to strike
out testimony of a witness even though the accused declined to
make the motion again later,' upon argument on instructions by
the court,' during questioning of a witness,0 during cross-examination of a witness,7 upon swearing the jury,8 and while the crime
was being re-enacted before the jury at the scene of the crime.'
The court, moreover, has repeatedly held that the accused's right
to be present at his trial when anything is done affecting him is
an inalienable right, 0 and a right which he cannot waive.'1 The
record must show his presence at the trial. 2 The court has even
gone so far as to hold it reversible error to hear testimony from
witnesses in the absence of the accused after a plea of guilty.'
1 W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 62, art. 3, § 2.
2197 S. E. 727 (W. Va. 1938).
3 State v. Conkle, 16 W. Va. 736 (1880).
4 State v. Sutter, 71 W. Va. 371, 76 S. B. 811 (1912).
5 State v. Howerton, 100 W. Va. 501, 130 S. E. 655 (1925).
6 State v. Detwiler, 60 W. Va. 583, 55 S. E. 654 (1906).
7 State v. Sheppard, 49 W. Va. 582, 39 S. E. 676 (1901) ; State v. Greer, 22
W. Va. 800 (1883).
8 Younger v. State, 2 W. Va. 579, 98 Am. Dec. 791 (1868).
9 State v. MeCausland, 82 W. Va. 525, 96 S. B. 938 (1918).
1o State v. Grove, 74 W. Va. 702, 82 S. E. 1019 (1914).
11 State v. MeCausland, 82 W. Va. 525, 96 S. B. 938 (1918).
12 Younger v. State, 2 W. Va. 579, 98 Am. Dee. 791 (1868).
13 State v. Stevenson, 64 W. Va. 392, 62 S. E. 688, 19 L. R. A. (N. s.) 713

(1908).
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The court has held in a few instances that the absence of the
accused was not reversible error, as where the accused was not in
the courtroom when the clerk called the names of the jurors who
had been selected, 14 and where the court, having denied a motion
for a new trial, asked counsel for the accused if he desired to make
any further argument on the motion,15 the court holding in both
instances that such matters were not part of the trial as contemplated by the statute. In the case of State v. McHaffa,'8 where
court and counsel discussed in the absence of the accused a motion to direct an acquittal of a first degree murder charge, it was
not reversible error because clearly not prejudicial.
The Virginia court has held that where the accused was absent when motion for new trial was made and denied, but was afterwards given the opportunity to make the motion again when
present, it was not reversible error.' 7 On similar facts, however, the
West Virginia court has held that this was error."8
In other jurisdictions the rule is generally not as strict as in
West Virginia, some holding that the accused may waive his right
to be present,19 and others that it is not reversible error to proceed
in the absence of the accused unless actual prejudice is shown.20
It would seem that the West Virginia rule is the better rule
because, while it occasionally puts the state to the expense of a
new trial, it assures the accused of a fairer and more impartial
trial by eliminating the possibility of anything prejudicial happening while he is absent, where under the other rules it would be
necessary to prove the prejudice or that he had waived his right
to be present.
J. C. A.
DIVORCE

-

DESERTION

-'

PENDENCY OF SUIT AS AFFECTING

CONTINUITY or DESERTION PERIOD. -

W and H married in 1909.

W left the family home March 29, 1934, because of alleged cruel
treatment by H. On July 25, 1935, T sued H for separate maintenance. H filed a cross bill for absolute divorce on the ground
of desertion. The court sustained a demurrer to the cross bill be14 State v. Lucas, 103 W. Va. 793, 138 S. E. 393 (1927).
1r State v. Parsons, 39 W. Va. 464, 19 S. E. 876 (1894).

l 110 W. Va. 266, 157 S. E. 595 (1931).
17 Bond v. Commonwealth, 83 Va. 581, 3 S. E. 149 (1889).
is State v. Grove, 74 W. Va. 702, 82 S. E. 1019 (1914).
) Hill v. State, 17 Wis. 675 (1864).
20 State v. Pierce, 123 N. C. 745, 31 S. E. 847 (1898).
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